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Arbitration: Shaffer v. Jeffery: The Oklahoma Supreme
Court Rejects the Separability Doctrine and Takes a Step
Back in the Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses Under
Oklahoma Law*

L Introduction

Arbitration' provides an alternative to the judicial resolution of disputes. As such,
it provides what many perceive to be advantages over the adjudication of parties'

disagreements by the courts. For instance, parties often seek arbitration of either
present or future controversies in order to avoid the potential for delay as well as
the high costs of litigation, or as a result of their dissatisfaction with judges and
juries.2 To assure that claims will be arbitrated, contracting parties include

arbitration clauses in their contracts.3 The clause generally requires that the parties
settle any dispute arising out of the contract through arbitration.!

Courts at the turn of the century disfavored the enforcement of arbitration
clauses.s While courts would respect the decision of an arbitrator once both parties

* The Oklahoma Law Review has awarded the author the Harry Alley-Leroy Allen Memorial Prize
for the Outstanding Case Note of 1997.
1. The term has been subject to various definitions, all amounting to the same thing. Perhaps the
best definition was provided in Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 95 P.2d 49 (Ariz. 1939), in which the
court stated:
[A]rbitration is a contractual proceeding, whereby the parties to any controversy or
dispute, in order to obtain an inexpensive and speedy final disposition of the matter
involved, select judges of their own choice and by consent submit their controversy to
such judges for determination, in the place of the tribunals provided by the ordinary
processes of law.
Id. at 50.
2. See Stuart L. Bass, The Expanding Role ofArbitrationand JudicialConcern: A Need to Redefine
GroundRules, LAB. L.J., Dec. 1995, at 1. At least one commentator has argued that arbitration can even
have emotional and psychological benefits over courtroom adjudication of disputes since each party
shares in control of the process. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation:
Dispute Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637, 658 (1976). However, it should be noted
that arbitration may also have disadvantages. Compare Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198, 203
(1956) (noting lack of right to jury trial, arbitrators' unfamiliarity with law, and limited judicial review)
with 16 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
1923C (3d ed. 1976) (cautioning that arbitrators need not disclose reasons for their decision as well as
noting the possibility that the award will be arbitrary).
3. See generally Joseph Shade, The Oil and Gas Lease and ADR: A Marriage Made in Heaven
Waiting to Happen, 30 TULSA LJ. 599 (1995) (calling for increased use of arbitration and other forms
of altemative dispute resolution in disputes arising out of oil and gas leases).
4. See 2A AM. JUR. 2D LEGAL FORMS § 23.32 (1990).
5. See United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1011 (S.D.N.Y.
1915) (refusing to enforce agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration). See generally Paul L.
Sayre, Development of CommercialArbitration Law, 37 YALE LJ. 595 (1928) (discussing traditional
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had consented to and undergone the arbitration process," they would not enforce an

arbitration clause if, prior to arbitration, one party wished to revoke the clause and
take his case to court 7 However, following the passage of the Federal Arbitration

Act (FAA)' in 1925, tie federal courts began to enforce arbitration clauses in cases
falling within the statute's coverage
Section 2 of the FAA has proven to be the key substantive provision.'0 It states
that arbitration clauses are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable except upon such

grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Based
upon this section, federal courts have held that if a party seeking recision of a
contract containing an arbitration clause alleges fraud in the inducement of the

arbitration clause, certainly a ground for the revocation of any contract, then the

clause will not be summarily enforced."2 Rather, a court applying the FAA will not

compel arbitration 3 until it has decided whether the clause was fraudulently
induced. 4 Similarly, section 4 of the FAA, a procedural provision, provides that
"if the making of the arbitration agreement... be in issue, the court shall proceed
summarily to the trial thereof." 5 This section has also provided a basis for
requiring a judicial determination of the question of fraud in the inducement of the
arbitration clause.'
However, to avoid summary enforcement in cases governed by the FAA, a party

must direct the claim of fraudulent inducement to the arbitration clause. If a party
to a contract merely alleges that the contract as a whole was fraudulently induced
and not the arbitration clause in particular, courts applying the FAA consider the
arbitration clause to be independent, enforceable, and separable from the main

hostility of courts toward the arbitration process).
6. See Burke Grain Co. v. Stinchcomb, 173 P. 204 (Okla. 1918), in which the court stated:
Where an arbitration is had, and the board of arbitrators acts within the scope of its
authority, and notice of the time of hearing is given the parties, and the evidence received,
and the amount of the award is not so excessive as that fraud may be presumed therefrom,
the award made by such arbitrators determines the rights of the parties as effectually as
a judgment by regular legal procedure ....
Id. at 205-06.
7. See Wilson v. Gregg, 255 P.2d 517, 519 (Okla. 1952) ("[A]rbitration agreements to submit
controversies arising in the future [are] unenforceable because they deprive the courts of jurisdiction and
are contrary to public policy").
8. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
9. See Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311, 320-21 (3d Cir. 1945) (construing statutory
exceptions broadly to allow case to fall within ambit of the FAA).
10. See Moses H. Coae Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983) ("Section 2
is the primary substantive provision of the Act .... The effect of the section is to create a body of
federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of
the Act").
11. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
12. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, 271 F.2d 402, 410-11 (2d Cir. 1959).
13. The FAA provisicn which provides for ordering arbitration is 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
14. See Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 410-11.
15. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
16. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
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contract. 17 The court will separate the arbitration clause from the main contract so
that its validity is not at issue and thus compel arbitration on the question of the
validity of the contract as a whole. 8 This is known as the separability doctrine.
The federal courts have utilized this doctrine to promote arbitration under the
FAA for several decades, 9 justifying the doctrine on four grounds. First, the
doctrine conforms with the intent of the contracting parties to arbitrate any issues
arising out of the contract. Second, enforcement of the doctrine furthers the policy
of arbitration in general. Third, a legal presumption exists that parties agree to two
contracts, the contract itself and the arbitration clause. Finally, courts have
historically reviewed only the findings of arbitrators and not the merits of the
disputeY'
Unlike the federal courts, for much of this century Oklahoma courts refused to
enforce arbitration clauses under state law, reasoning that their enforcement deprived
the courts of what was rightfully their jurisdiction." However, in 1978 Oklahoma
adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA)," which provided a statutory basis for
the enforcement of arbitration clauses. Since then, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
upheld the enforcement of arbitration clauses under the Act,2 despite concerns that
doing so violates the Oklahoma Constitution's guarantee of the right of access to the
courts.U
As for the separability doctrine, courts followed the doctrine in cases governed
by Oklahoma's version of the UAA provided that they were persuaded by the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals' decision in Wetzel v. Covenant Oil Corp.' in 1986.
However, in Shaffer v. Jeffery, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the
doctrine, holding that allegations of fraud in the inducement of a contract, apart
from the arbitration clause, must be resolved by a court before ordering arbitration
or dismissing the case." With this decision, the court took a decisive step back in

17. See id.
18. See Janet A. Rosen,ArbitrationUnder PrivateInternationalLaw: The Doctrinesof Separability
and Competence de la Competence, 17 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 599, 607 (1994).
19. See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959); Pioneer Supply Co. v. American
Meter Co., 484 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
20. See Rosen, supranote 18,at 607 (citing STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBrrRATION:
THREE SALIENT PROBLEMs 3-6 (1987)).
21. See supra note 7.
22. 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 801-818 (1991).
23. See Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Okla. 1996).
24. See Rollings, 910 P.2d at 1037-42 (Opala, J.,
concurring); Raines v. Independent School Dist.
No. 6, 796 P.2d 303, 304-06 (Okla. 1990) (Opala, C.J., concurring); Long v. DeGeer, 753 P.2d 1327,
1330 (Okla. 1988) (Opala, J.,
concurring). See generally Richard E.Coulson, Is ContractualArbitration
an UnconstitutionalWaiver of the Right to Trial By Jury in Oklahoma?, 16 OKLA. CITY. U. L. REv. 1
(1991) (discussing the question prior to the Rollings decision).
25. 733 P.2d 424 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986). Decisions by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals are not
binding precedent unless approved by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. See 20 OKLA. STAT. § 30.5 (Supp.
1996).
26. 915 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1996).
27. See id at 917.
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what had previously appeared to be a stance in favor of the enforcement of
arbitration clauses under the UAA.
However, the decision would be of limited importance were it not for a second,
more problematic statement by the Shaffer court. The UAA, prior to Shaffer,
governed only those Oklahoma cases which did not involve interstate commerce.
Cases involving interstate commerce were instead governed by the FAA."
However, the Shffer court stated that while the FAA would otherwise govern
arbitration in cases involving interstate commerce, parties may exclude the FAA by
agreeing in a choice-of-law provision that state arbitration rules, as provided in the
UAA, apply.' This statement appears to have been an attempt by the court to take
a stand against the encroachment of the FAA on state arbitration law by allowing
parties to choose not to be governed by federal law." However, if followed, this
rule could have quite the opposite effect.
After Shaffer's rejection of the separability doctrine, parties who wish to ensure
arbitration of all disputes arising out of a contract will make certain that they do not
include the UAA in a choice-of-law provision. Rather, they will make clear that
their contract evidences an involvement with interstate commerce, perhaps even
going so far as to include the FAA in a choice-of-law provision, and then raise the
preemption issue when moving to compel arbitration so as to ensure that federal law
applies. Therefore, the reaction of future contracting parties to Shaffer's rejection
of the separability doctrine under state law and the Oklahoma Supreme Court's
apparent willingness to apply that law even in cases governed by the FAA, could
result in the virtual superfluity of state arbitration law and a de facto federalization
of arbitration in Oklahoma.
This note will focus on the problems inherent in Shaffer and the potential impact
of the case on arbitration in Oklahoma. Part II will analyze the problems with
Shafftr's rejection of the separability doctrine. First, the history of the separability
doctrine in federal and Oklahoma courts will be discussed. Next, the case itself will
be examined in light of the federal courts' view of the doctrine, cases from other
jurisdictions, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court's own decisions. Part I will
discuss whether the Shaffer court was correct in holding that parties could choose
not to be governed by federal law through a choice-of-law provision. The United
States Supreme Court's treatment of the issue will be considered as the Court's view
of the FAA's applicability makes clear that the Shaffer court erred in holding as it
did.

28. See Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030, 1041-42 (Okla. 1996) (Opala, J.,
concurring); Southern Okla. Healthcare Corp. v. JHBR, 900 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
29. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 915 n.10.
30. See generally Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of
ArbitrationLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985) (discussing the increasing scope of the FAA at the expense
of state arbitration law).
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II. The Rejection of the Separability Doctrine
A. Law Priorto the Case
1. The Federal Courts' View of the Separability Doctrine Under the FAA
Shaffer's impact on arbitration in Oklahoma does not become clear without an
examination of the federal courts' view of the separability doctrine. The reasons
provided in the federal decisions for their adoption of the separability doctrine
clearly demonstrate the soundness of the doctrine under the FAA and apply equally
as well to an analysis of the issue under the UAA. With these reasons in mind, the
shortcomings of Shaffer soon come to light.
The Second Circuit made the first clear pronouncement of the federal courts' view
of the separability doctrine under the FAA in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc." In Robert Lawrence, the plaintiff alleged that the contract in
question was fraudulently induced! 2 The contract contained an arbitration clause
and the defendant moved to compel arbitration.33 Therefore, the court faced the
issue of whether the arbitration clause was enforceable.
In accepting the separability doctrine, the court interpreted section 2 of the FAA.
This section states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.'
The Robert Lawrence court reasoned that section 2 clearly focused on the
arbitration clause rather than the contract as a whole and thus contemplated that the
two were distinct." Since the two were distinct, if a party sought recision for
fraud, alleging only fraudulent inducement of the contract as a whole, and not the
arbitration clause in particular, then the arbitration clause was unaffected by the
claim and stood as valid and irrevocable. Therefore, the matter of the validity of the
main contract would be sent to arbitration as the resolution of such disputes was the
purpose of the arbitration clause.' Only if a party alleged fraud in the inducement
of the arbitration clause itself would the FAA afford the federal courts jurisdiction

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
See id. at 404.
See id.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
See Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 409-10.
See i&at 410.
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to decide the issue.' In addition to relying upon precedent which had upheld the

separability of arbitration clauses, the Robert Lawrence court emphasized two other
important policies behind the separability doctrine. The court noted that promoting
arbitration through the doctrine satisfied the intent of the parties when they made
the contract and lightened the dockets of the federal courts?'
The United States Supreme Court followed the Robert Lawrence holding in
PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. 9 In Prima Paint, the Court took
a different approach in accepting the separability doctrine by relying upon section

4 of the FAA which mandates that federal courts are to order arbitration once they
are satisfied that "the making of the agreement for arbitration ... is not in issue."'
The Court held that federal courts may only consider whether the making and
performance of the arbitration clause itself was fraudulently induced, or "in issue,"
and could not adjudicate claims as to fraudulent inducement of the contract as a
whole.4' Since the PrimaPaintdecision, federal courts have consistently followed
the separability doctrine! 2
2. The SeparabilityDoctrine Under Oklahoma Law

Arbitration in Oklahoma cases not involving interstate commerce is governed by
the UAA.43 Prior to Shaffer, the only Oklahoma case involving the applicability of
the separability doctrine under Oklahoma's version of the UAA was handed down
by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Wetzel v. Covenant Oil Corp.' in 1986. In

37. See id. at 411.
38. See id. at 410. The court expanded on this notion, stating:
Once it is settled that arbitration agreements am "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," we
know of no principle of law that stands as an obstacle to a determination by the parties
to the effect that -bitration should not be denied or postponed upon the mere cry of fraud
in the inducement, as this would permit the frustration of the very purposes sought to be
achieved by the agreement to arbitrate, i.e. a speedy and relatively inexpensive trial before
commercial specinlists.
Id.
39. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). See generally Note, FederalArbitration Act and Application of the
"SeparabilityDoctrine"in FederalCourts, 1968 DuKE LJ. 588 (1968) (discussing PrimaPaintdecision).
40. Prima Paine, 388 U.S. at 403 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
41. See id. at 403-04.
42. See Meyer v. Dais un Jardin, S.A., 816 F.2d 533,538 (10th Cir. 1987); Unionmutual Stock Life
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524, 528-29 (1st Cir. 1985); Arent v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 770, 772 (D. Mass. 1985); Pioneer Supply Co. v. American
Meter Co., 484 F. Supp. 227, 228 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
43. See Southern Olla. Health Care Corp. v. JHBR, 900 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995)
("[l]f the agreement . . evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce, the FAA and
accompanying federal law,control, and the central provisions of the federal law must be applied by state
courts") (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)). However, this statement must be
qualified by Shaffer. Acowrding to Shaffer, even if the transaction involves interstate commerce, the UAA
will apply if selected by the parties in a choice-of-law clause. See Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910, 915
n.10 (Okla. 1996).
44. 733 P.2d 424 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986). The Oklahoma Supreme Court also sided with the
separability doctrine in Long v. DeGeer, 753 P.2d 1327, 1330 n.8 (Okla. 1987). However, the Shaffer
court indicated that the decision was made according to New York law. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 915 n.9.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss2/9

1997]

NOTES

Wetzel, the court held that the district court had improperly denied arbitration when
a party alleged fraud in the inducement of the main contract.45
In accepting the separability doctrine, the Wetzel court cited precedent in other
states, as well as PrimaPaint,and noted that section 801 of Oklahoma's version of
the UAA directed courts to "effectuate [the Act's] general purpose to make uniform
the law of those states which enact it."' Thus, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals
accepted the separability doctrine, in part basing its decision upon the need for
uniformity with the decisions of other states which had adopted the separability
doctrine under the UAA. In Shaffer, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected this
view and placed Oklahoma in the minority of states which have considered the issue
by holding that arbitration clauses are not separable from the contract in which they
are contained.
B. Statement of the Case
1. Facts/Holding
47
In Shaffer, the plaintiffs were six couples who had hoped to adopt children.
They entered into an agreement, which contained an arbitration clause, with an
attorney who was to find a child for the couples. The lawyer collected his fee but
only provided the plaintiffs with promises from nonexistent mothers and status
reports from fictitious pregnancies.49 It became clear that there were no children,
and the plaintiffs sued to rescind the contract, and sought damages for breach of
contract, conversion, the tort of outrage, fraud, and legal malpractice."
The Shaffer court clearly stated the issue: "Does a showing of fraud in the
inducement of the attorney-client contract defeat the enforcement of the arbitration
clause in that contract?"'" The court answered in the affirmative, rejecting the
separability doctrine by holding that allegations of fraud in the inducement of the
attorney-client contract, regardless of the arbitration clause, must be resolved by the
court before compelling arbitration or dismissing the case. The court then
apparently extended the holding to all contracts, not merely those between an
attorney and client, stating, "[A]n agreement to arbitrate is voidable when either the
arbitration provision of the agreement or the contract containing that agreement is
fraudulently induced. The plaintiffs must be given the opportunity to prove the
existence of the fraud they allege occurred."' This holding squarely conflicts with
federal jurisprudence and suffices as a clear rejection of the separability doctrine.

45. See Wetzel, 733 P2d at 426.
46. Id. (quoting 15 OKLA. STAT. § 801 (1981)).
47. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 912.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.at 914.
See id. at 917.
Id.
at 918.
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2. Rationale
The court placed the case within the ambit of the UAA, because the parties
agreed in a choice-of-law provision that the Act would govern arbitration. '
According to the court, the relevant provision of the UAA was section 802(A)
which states:
This act shall apply to a written agreement to submit any existing
controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit
to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties.
Such agreements are valid, enforceable and irrevocable, except upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
55
contract.
The Shaffer court noted that the section was almost identical to section 2 of the
FAA.' However, rather than looking to any federal cases which had analyzed the
separability doctrine under section 2, the court set the tone for its decision by stating
that section 802(A) of the UAA, like section 2 of the FAA, made arbitration clauses
revocable upon such grounds as existed at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.' This was a keen twist on the statute as section 802(A) focused on the
irrevocability of arbitration clauses rather than situations in which they were
revocable. Further, while the statement made clear that allegations of fraud directed
toward the arbitration clause itself would render the clause invalid, it left open the
question of whether allegations of fraud directed toward the contract as a whole
made the arbitration clause subject to revocation, or whether the clause was separate
from the main contract. In the end, though the court recognized PrimaPaintas well
as the Wetzel decision, it sided with Louisiana, Minnesota, and Tennessee in
rejecting the separability doctrine in cases governed by state arbitration law."8
After outlining the position of other courts, both federal and state, which had
considered the issue, the Shaffer court at last began its analysis of the separability
doctrine by attacking one of the doctrine's justifications. Specifically, the court
recited the notion that staying arbitration pending the resolution of allegations of
fraud in the inducement of a contract would delay a remedy which could be
provided by arbitration." However, the court responded that the separability
doctrine did not provide a solution as a party need only allege that the arbitration
clause itself was fraudulently induced, and the matter would have to be decided by
a court anyway.'
Rather than analyzing further reasons which would justify adoption of the
doctrine, the Shaffer court listed only more reasons for rejecting the separability
54. See id at 915 n.10.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 914 (quotingg 15 OKLA. STAT. § 802(A) (1991)) (emphasis added by the court).
See id at 914 nn.5 & 6.
See id. at 914.
See id at 915-16.
See id at 916.
See id.
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doctrine, including the principle set forth by Justice Black in his PrimaPaintdissent
that if "the contract was procured by fraud, then unless the defrauded party elects
to affirm it, there is absolutely no contract, nothing to be arbitrated.''" This
statement was perhaps the central reason behind the court's rejection of the
separability doctrine as it sums up the rather conclusory notion that the arbitration
clause is merely a part of the main contract rather than a separate agreement. The
court also cited a Louisiana case in which the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned
that courts have more experience in resolving matters that go to the validity of
contract formation than do arbitrators.62
Before announcing its holding, the court made two rather astounding comments
which indicated the court's unwillingness to enforce arbitration clauses when fraud
is alleged in the inducement of the main contract. First, as noted above, the court
suggested that courts are better suited than arbitrators to determine issues of fraud.
The court then stated that "[r]esolution of claims such as fraud by those who are
best suited to perform the task will enhance the arbitration process."' Not only
does this statement assume that judges are better at resolving an issue which has a
large factual component but more importantly reveals the court's failure to address
the key issue of the parties' intent, never answering the question of whether the
parties had actually agreed to have allegations of fraud resolved by arbitration. Even
if courts were better suited than arbitrators to determine issues of fraud, refusing to
enforce the arbitration clause would only frustrate the parties' intent. It is not clear
how this would enhance the arbitration process.
Second, the court made a statement which revealed a fundamental weakness in
the Shaffer rationale. The court stated that section 802(A) of the UAA applies not
only to the arbitration clause, but also the underlying contract.' In other words,
not only the arbitration clause but also the main contract is irrevocable except upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity. However, this merely states the obvious.
Clearly, the main contract is irrevocable except upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity. However, the legislature, fully aware of judicial hostility toward
arbitration, envisioned a distinction between the main contract and the arbitration
clause. For this reason, they saw fit to enact a statute providing that the arbitration
clause itself was irrevocable, to the same extent as any other contract.
The rationale of the Shaffer court was hardly clear. The opinion recited a few of
the reasons why some state courts had rejected the separability doctrine, but never
analyzed the main reasons why both the federal and the majority of state courts had
adopted it. The two primary reasons with which the court should have dealt were
the intent of the contracting parties to arbitrate any issues arising out of the contract
and the fact that section 802(A) of the UAA visualized the arbitration clause as

61. Id. at 917 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 412 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 917 (citing George Engine Co. v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., 350 So. 2d 881, 88586 (La. 1977)).

63. Id.
64. See id.
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distinct from the main contract, and therefore separable. Instead, the Shaffer court
concluded its analysis by stating that rejecting the separability doctrine simply
"make[s] more sense.'
C. Analysis
1. PreliminaryProblems

The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer sends a clear signal that, in
cases decided under Oklahoma arbitration law, courts will not enforce the
separability doctrine. There are several problems with this decision. First, the case
stands in opposition to the federal courts' interpretation of the FAA. Therefore,
Shaffer creates two distinct bodies of arbitration law in Oklahoma courts. Absent
a choice-of-law provision, if a contract involves interstate commerce, Oklahoma
state courts will apply the FAA and enforce the separability doctrine under Prima
Paint. If the contract does not involve interstate commerce, Oklahoma courts will
apply the UAA and refuse to enforce the separability doctrine under Shaffer.
Therefore, whether a party can enforce an arbitration clause in cases involving
alleged fraudulent inducement of the main contract will often depend upon whether
the party was fortunate enough to have entered into a contract involving interstate
commerce.
Second, the case does not fall in line with the decisions of the majority of states
that have adopted the UAA. Therefore, the Shaffer holding violates the spirit of
section 801 of the UAA which states that the Act "shall be so construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact
it." The importance of this section was pointed out by the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals in Wetzel vhen that court accepted the separability doctrine. Further, the
value of a uniform statute is lessened when courts refuse to apply it uniformly.
Finally, the decision adds to the uncertainty surrounding the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's somewhat ambivalent attitude toward arbitration as evidenced by prior
cases.' After Shaffer, though parties may include an arbitration clause in a
contract, they will not be able to compel arbitration on the issue of whether the
contract was fraudulently induced if the case is governed by Oklahoma state
arbitration law. This adds yet another question to the future of arbitration under
Oklahoma law.
2. A Roundabout Response to the Federal Courts' Adherence to the
SeparabilityDoctrine

There are several problems with the Shaffer rationale insofar as it addressed the
federal courts' view of the separability doctrine. First, the court stated that the

65.. Md
66. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 801 (1991).
67. Compare Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc. 910 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1996) (upholding
enforcement of arbitration clause despite constitutional attack) with Cannon v. Lane, 867 P.2d 1235
(Okla. 1993) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause by finding that contract was not covered by the
UAA).
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relevant provision of Oklahoma's Uniform Arbitration Act which it was interpreting
was section 802(A).' However, the court never took into account the federal
courts' analysis of section 2 of the FAA, a provision which even the Shaffer court
noted was nearly identical to section 802(A) of the UAA.69 In doing so, the Shaffer
court rejected the federal courts' adoption of the separability doctrine under section
2 of the FAA without addressing the reasons why those courts had accepted the
doctrine. Addressing those reasons would have broadened the court's analysis by
recognizing the argument that section 802(A) of the UAA visualizes the arbitration
clause as distinct from the main contract and, therefore, separable.
Most notably, the Shaffer court failed to recognize the reasoning of the Second
Circuit in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,Inc.,70 a case relied upon
by the United States Supreme Court when it reached its decision in Prima Paint.
The analysis set forth in the decision bears repeating. The Robert Lawrence court
interpreted section 2 of the FAA to mean that arbitration clauses were indeed
separable from the main contract.71 The court found that the written agreement
described in section 2 of the FAA was the arbitration clause' The statute, by
singling out the arbitration clause, contemplated that it was distinct from the main
contract." Finally, the statute plainly stated that the clause was valid, enforceable,
and irrevocable, except on grounds that exist at law or in equity.'
Thus, if a party alleges fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause, clearly
a ground for revoking contracts in the courts, then obviously a court must adjudicate
the matter before enforcing the clause. 5 However, if the party does not allege
fraud in the arbitration clause but rather the main contract, then, according to the
Robert Lawrence court, the arbitration clause remains distinct from the main
contract.76 The allegation of fraud does not concern the arbitration clause and it
remains valid, enforceable, and irrevocable.' Therefore, the court will enforce it
and compel arbitration on the question of whether the contract itself was
fraudulently induced. The Robert Lawrence court bolstered its rationale with the
policy of favoring arbitration in order to comply with the intent of the parties as
well as to clear court congestion.78
The Robert Lawrence rationale is uniquely applicable to the Shaffer analysis.
Like its federal counterpart, section 802(A) of Oklahoma's version of the UAA
envisions the arbitration clause on an equal footing with the main contract, and
therefore, like the main contract, enforceable "except upon such grounds as exist at

68. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 914.

69. See id.
at 914 nn.5 & 6.
70. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
71. See id.at 410.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id. at 409-10.
See id.
Seeid. at 410.
See id. at 411.
See id.
See id. at 410.
See id
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law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' It is obvious that the main
contract is valid and irrevocable except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity.
However, by making clear that the same applies to arbitration clauses, the
Oklahoma legislature saw the two as distinct and placed arbitration clauses on level
ground with other contracts. By allowing a party to avoid arbitration without
directing the allegation of fraudulent inducement at the arbitration clause, the
Shaffer decision allows a party to revoke the clause in a way not allowed under the
statute. If a party may invalidate an arbitration clause without alleging that the
clause itself was fraudulently induced, then the clause is revocable on grounds not
existing at law or in equity. Though a separate contract, the arbitration clause is
invalidated pending a court's decision that it was not fraudulently induced simply
because it is printed on the same page as the main contract.
Further, other provisions of Oklahoma's version of the UAA contemplate that a
party must specifically allege fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself
in order for a court to stay arbitration pending resolution of the claim. Section
803(A) states that, fllowing a party's motion to compel arbitration,
If the opposing party denies the existence of the agreementto arbitrate,
the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue
raised and shall order arbitration if the court resolves the issue in favor
of the moving party; otherwise, the application shall be denied.'
Section 803(B) states that:
On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced
or threatened on a showing that there is no valid agreementto arbitrate.
Such an issue shall be summarily tried. If the issue is resolved in favor
of the moving party, the court may order a permanent stay of such
proceeding. If the issue is resolved in favor of the opposing party, the
court shall order the parties to proceed to arbitration.8
Both sections noted above clearly contemplate that in order for the court to resolve
the issue of whether the arbitration clause is enforceable, the opposing party must
specifically direct the allegation of fraud at the arbitration clause rather than merely
toward the main contract. n
The second problem with the Shaffer court's analysis of the federal position lies
in its stretching to find federal case law to support its decision. This attempt to
harmonize the federal courts' view of the issue with that of Shaffer demonstrates the
difficulty with which the court tried to reconcile its view with established federal
jurisprudence. For example, the court began its examination of the federal view of
the separability doctrine by relying upon a United States Supreme Court case as

79. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 802(A) (1991); 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
80. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 803(A) (1991) (emphasis added).
81. Id. § 803(B) (emphasis added).
82. Cf. Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 400 N.E.2d 858, 862 (Mass. 1980) (discussing the issue
in relation to Massachusetts' version of the UAA).
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analogous when it actually involved a scenario quite different than that of Shaffer.
The court cited Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities,' for the proposition that
the question of fraud in the inducement of the contract as a whole must be
adjudicated by a court before compelling arbitration.' Under this view, the
arbitration clause would not be separated from the main contract and enforced.
Instead, a court would decide the validity of the main contract. If it was
fraudulently procured, then the arbitration clause, as an inextricable part of that
contract, would also be invalid. Because the arbitration clause was invalid, the court
would not compel arbitration. To support this position, the Shaffer court quoted
Moseley, stating that "the issue of fraud should first be adjudicated before the rights
of the parties under the subcontracts can be determined
... If [fraud is established]
'
there can be no arbitration under the subcontracts." S
There are two problems with the Shaffer court's interpretation of Moseley. First,
the Shaffer court intended Moseley to provide an affirmative response to the issue
it placed before itself. The court asked whether "a showing of fraud in the
inducement of the.., contract defeat[s] the enforcement of the arbitration clause
in that contract?"' However, when the Moseley Court discussed the issue of
fraud, it was clearly referring to a showing of fraud in the inducement of the
arbitrationclause. The Moseley Court stated that "with reference to the allegation
of fraud . . . the issue goes to the arbitration clause itself."' Therefore, the
Moseley Court asked whether the arbitration clause itself was induced by fraud, not
the main contract.n
Second, while the Shaffer court noted that in Moseley the plaintiff alleged
fraudulent inducement of both the main contract and the arbitration clause, the court
did not recognize the importance of these facts.89 The Moseley situation was not
analogous to Shaffer. The plaintiffs in Shaffer only alleged that the main contract
was fraudulently induced, never directing the allegation toward the arbitration
clause. Therefore, the validity of the arbitration clause was not directly placed at
issue by the pleadings in Shaffer as it was in Moseley,' and there would be no
reason for a court to adjudicate the matter. The Shaffer court may have read
Moseley to represent a situation in which the validity of the arbitration clause was
placed at issue because it was part of an overall fraudulent "scheme." However, a

83. 374 U.S. 167 (1963).
84. See Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910, 914 (Okla. 1996). The court stated that the issue was
whether "a showing of fraud in the inducement of the attorney-client contract defeat[s the enforcement
of the arbitration clause in that contract?" Id.
85. Id. at 914-15 (quoting Moseley, 374 U. S. at 171).
86. Id. at 914 (emphasis added).
87. Moseley, 374 U.S. at 171.
88. The concurring opinion reiterated this point when the Chief Justice stated: "[w]e agree with the
Court that fraud in the procurement of an arbitration contract, like fraud in the procurement of any
contract, makes it void and unenforceable and that this question of fraud is a judicial one, which must
be determined by a court. Moseley, 374 U.S. at 172 (Warren, CJ., concurring).
89. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 914.

90. See Moseley, 374 U.S. at 170 ("[T]he petitioner has attacked not only the subcontracts, but also
the arbitration clauses contained therein").
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clear reading of Moseley demonstrates that the plaintiff in the case attacked "the
subcontracts, as well as the arbitration agreement, as being fraudulent."'"
Instead of resolving the matter of whether arbitration clauses are separable from
the contract in which they are contained, the Shaffer holding instead raises puzzling
issues. For example, the court stated: "We conclude that allegations of fraud in the
inducement of an agreement to arbitrate must be resolved by the court prior to
either compelling arbitration or dismissing the case."' This is nothing new. A
federal court would also resolve the issue of whether the defendant had fraudulently
induced the arbitration clause. However, the court added: "We also conclude that
allegations of fraud in the inducement of the attorney-client contract or agreement
generally, apart from the clause to arbitrate, must be resolved by the court prior to
either compelling arbitration or dismissing the case.""
This holding, if interpreted literally, could make for a rather unique set of
circumstances. The court clearly contemplated a situation in which a plaintiff
alleged fraud in the inducement of the contract as one among several claims.
Therefore, the court would first adjudicate the issue of fraud in the inducement of
the contract. If the curt found that the plaintiffs allegations were without merit,
then it would compel arbitration on the other issues raised.
However, the rule set forth would appear to allow a court to decide the merits of
the case but then compel arbitration on precisely the same issue. For example,
consider a scenario in which a plaintiff were to seek recision of a contract which
contained an arbitration clause. In seeking recision, the plaintiff in this hypothetical
situation alleges only one ground, fraud in the inducement of the contract. Most
likely, the defendant would move to compel arbitration. However, a court following
Shaffer would be required to first adjudicate the issue of whether the contract as a
whole was invalid. Since the arbitration clause is inseparable from the main
contract, the court would also implicitly decide whether the arbitration clause was
fraudulently induced. If the court decided that the main contract was not
fraudulently induced, then the arbitration clause would also be valid. Because the
clause was valid, would the court find for the defendant and compel arbitration on
the matter of whether the contract was fraudulently induced, forcing him to go
through the process a second time? This is obviously illogical and appears unlikely
in light of res judicata concerns." At any rate, the defendant would most likely
voluntarily dismiss his motion to compel arbitration. Still, it is important to note
that this problem, albeit largely academic, would not arise were a court to make use
of the separability doctrine since the court would not decide whether the main
contract was fraudulently induced. 5

91. Id at 169; see also Jarvis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D. Vt. 1985)
(noting the importance of the fact that the plaintiff in Moseley specifically attacked the arbitration clause).
92. Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 917.

93. Id.
94. Cf. Mindana v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 985 F.2d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (upholding trial
court's enjoinment of arbitration of claims which could have been brought in prior federal action).
95. For example, in McElwee-Courbis Constr. Co. v. Rife, 133 F. Supp. 790 (M.D. Pa. 1955), the
court used the separability doctrine to compel arbitration on the issue of fraud. The court dispelled any

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss2/9

1997]

NOTES

The likely result in the scenario discussed above is that the court would merely
dismiss the plaintiffs case, but, with the arbitration clause implicitly found valid,
would the plaintiff then be free to submit the issue of fraudulent inducement to
arbitration to give it another try? Again, this result seems illogical and unlikely due
to the effect of res judicata.' However, coupling the validity of the arbitration
clause with that of the main contract raises just these sorts of logical inconsistencies.
The enforcement of arbitration clauses via the separability doctrine would avoid
these dilemmas.
There are other problems with Shaffer's look at the federal courts' view of the
separability doctrine. After recognizing the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Prima Paint' as well as the adoption of the separability doctrine by the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Wetzel,98 the Shaffer court took a rather interesting
approach in attacking the separability doctrine. Rather than squarely confronting the
federal courts' adoption of the separability doctrine, the court singled out and
criticized the New York Court of Appeals' rationale for adopting the separability
doctrine, apparently because New York's arbitration statute served as a model for
the FAA."
This approach skirted the issue that the court placed before itself. The court
stated that "[t]he question before us is whether we should give the Oklahoma
Arbitration Act the same construction as given to the Federal Arbitration Act by the
Supreme Court in Prima Paint."'" However, by attacking a New York court's
rationale for adopting the separability doctrine, the court was able to criticize the
separability doctrine by scrutinizing a reason given in a state case without analyzing
the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Prima Painte"' or other federal
cases"~ involving the separability of arbitration clauses.

question of res judicata problems when it stated:
What has been said here on the matter of fraud and misrepresentation is predicated on
such uncontradicted facts as were before the Court at this initial stage in the proceedings
and has relation only to the question of what bearing it might have on the issue of
compelling, in the first instance, compliance with the arbitration clause. It naturally should
not be considered as res judicata or binding upon the arbitrators on any issue which they
may properly consider in arriving at their final determination after a full hearing of all the
evidence presented to them by all the parties.
Id. at 796.
96. It would appear that the doctrine of "bar" would preclude the plaintiff from raising the issue
again. See United States v. Ryan, 810 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 1987) ("'Bar' means that a final judgment
in favor of a defendant bars a second action by the plaintiff on the same claim").

97. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 915, 916. The court merely stated the rule laid down in Prima Paint.
It never recognized the reasons given for the adoption of the separability doctrine in the case.

98. See id. at 915. The same holds true for Wetzel. The Shaffer court merely recognized that the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals had adopted the separability doctrine without analyzing why it had done so.

See id.
99. See id. at 916.
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
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More importantly, the Shaffer court asked the wrong question. The court phrased
the issue in terms of whether it should give the UAA the same construction given
the FAA by the United States Supreme Court in Prima Paint. However, the Prima
Paint Court focused on section 4 of the FAA." The Shaffer court focused on a
completely different section of the UAA, section 802(A), which is substantially
identical to section 2 of the FAA."°' Since the Shaffer court purported to decide
a question of state law, 5 United States Supreme Court decisions were not
controlling. Therefore, the court should have looked for guidance to a case more
analogous to its situation. The court should have asked whether it should give
section 802(A) of the UAA the same construction as that given the section by other
state cases or that given section 2 of the FAA by the Second Circuit in Robert
Lawrence.
Rather than responding to either Prima Paint or Robert Lawrence, the Shaffer
court chose to focus on Weinrott v. Carp,"° a 1973 case out of the New York
Court of Appeals. According to the Shaffer court, the New York court adopted the
separability doctrine because "an unsupported allegation of fraud [in the inducement
of the main contract] could cause delay by allowing its resolution in the New York
courts," thus delaying resolution of the matter and frustrating the parties' intent."m
However, the Shaffer court responded by stating that enforcement of the separability
doctrine would not prevent delay because even in courts that follow the doctrine,
a party need only allege fraud in the arbitration clause itself and delay will
result."ta
The Shaffer court attacked the separability doctrine by noting only one among the
many reasons that courts have adopted the doctrine, the avoidance of delay, and
then assailing that position. However, apart from failing to take into account the
other reasons" why courts have adopted the doctrine, most notably the parties'
intent to arbitrate, the Shaffer court's response to Weinrott failed to recognize the
effect that Oklahoma procedural rules, if adequately enforced, could have in
preventing unsupported allegations of fraud in the inducement of arbitration clauses.
For instance, Oklahoma law requires that "[iun all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.""' As applied to allegations of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration
clause, a party would have to make something more than a bare allegation of fraud
in order to avoid dismissal.'"

103. See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. 5. 395, 403-04 (1967).
104. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 914 nn.5 & 6.
105. It is not altogether clear whether this was a question of state law. The issue of whether the
FAA preempted state law in this case constitutes Part III of this note.
106. 298 N.E.2d 42 (N.Y. 1973).
107. Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 916 (citing Weinrott, 298 N.E.2d at 46).
108. See id.

109. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
110. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2009(B) (1991).
111. In Gay v. Akin, 766 P.2d 985 (Okla. 1988), the court outlined the parameters of Rule 2009(B)
when it stated that the nile required "specification of the time, place and content of an alleged false
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Further, Oklahoma rules of procedure raise the possibility of sanctions for
attorneys who present pleadings to the court for the purpose of "unnecessary
delay'" 2 or who present allegations with no evidentiary support."' The federal
courts have imposed Rule 11"4 sanctions against parties who presented legally
unsupportable allegations of fraud in the inducement of arbitration clauses in order
to avoid arbitration." 5 If Oklahoma courts were willing to use the state rules at
their disposal to sanction those who attempt to avoid arbitration by making meritless
allegations of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause, the Shaffer court's
response to Weinrott would not stand. Parties would be hesitant to make unsupported allegations of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause for the sole
purpose of keeping the question of the validity of the main contract out of
arbitration.
Finally, by only responding to the question of delay, the Shaffer court neglected
to address the most important reason behind the Weinrott court's adoption of the
separability doctrine. The Weinrott court stated that when the parties to a contract
have chosen to place all questions regarding the validity, interpretation and
enforcement of the contract in the hands of arbitrators, then they have selected their
tribunal and intend that it should decide the contract's validity should the issue
arise." 6 The central purpose behind the separability doctrine is then clearly a
desire to comply with the contracting parties' intent."7 Implicit in the Weinrott
reasoning is the notion that parties are free to include a clause in the main contract
which refers all disputes arising out of the contract to arbitration, including claims
of fraud in the inducement of the contract itself. However, the Shaffer court never
addressed the key issue of whether the rejection of the separability doctrine
frustrated the contracting parties' intent.
Instead, the Shaffer court took a different view. The court cited the dissent in
PrimaPaint,in which Justice Black stated, "if the contract was procured by fraud,

representation, but not the circumstances or evidence from which fraudulent intent could be inferred."
Id. at 993 (quoting McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 228 (lst Cir. 1980); see also
Gianfillippo v. Northland Cas. Co., 861 P.2d 308, 311 (Okla. 1993) (affirming trial court's dismissal of
claim of fraud for failure to specify time, place and content of alleged false representation).
112. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2011(B)(1) (1991).
113. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2011(B)(3) (1991).
114. FED, R. Civ. P. 11.
115. See Robinson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 15,20-21 (D. Mass. 1989) (imposing
Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff who opposed defendant's motion to compel arbitration based upon
allegations of fraud); Gonick v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(imposing Rule 11 sanctions for, among other things, a party's failure to support claim of fraud in
inducement of arbitration clause).
116. See Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42, 47 (N.Y. 1973).
117. See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d. Cir. 1959) in which
the court stated:
It would seem to be beyond dispute that the parties are entitled to agree, should they
desire to do so, that one of the questions for the arbitrators to decide in case the
controversy thereafter arises, is whether or not one of the parties was induced by fraud

to make the principal contract ....
Id. at 410.
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then unless the defrauded party elects to affirm it, there is absolutely no contract,
nothing to be arbitrated.""' The court sided with this view, stating that it was in
line with the court's view of Qklahoma's "state law as to contracts in general.' 1 9
It is understandable how the court could adopt this position. The statement sums
up the idea that if the main contract was procured by fraud, then it is void ab initio
and arbitration would be pointless. More specifically, if the main contract was
tainted by fraud, then the arbitration clause, as a part of that contract, was also
fraudulently procured and enforcement of the clause would be illogical.'
However, while this view more or less assumes that the arbitration clause is not a
separate contract, but rather a part of the main contract, the crucial weakness in this
view is one of timing. Certainly, if the contract was fraudulently induced then,
assuming the arbitration clause was inseparable, enforcement would be wrong.
However, utilizing this view to reject the separability doctrine at the outset assumes
that the contract was procured by fraud. When the defendant moves to compel
arbitration, the issue has not yet been decided. Therefore, it is by no means clear
that either the main contract or the arbitration clause was induced by fraud. Further,
this is precisely the sort of issue that the parties likely intended arbitration to
resolve. By refusing to enforce the arbitration clause, a court essentially assumes
that it was fraudulently procured.
While the Shaffer court purported to deal with a contractual issue, it never
considered the importance of the parties' intent in providing for arbitration. Even
if parties intended that disputes regarding the alleged fraudulent inducement of a
contract be referred to arbitration, after Shaffer, courts may wholly overlook that
intent when such disputes arise. Second, the court connoted that there was no real
distinction between the arbitration clause and the main contract. The Shaffer
rationale implies that the arbitration clause is so inextricably woven into the main
contract that the fraudulent inducement of the main contract necessarily entails the
fraudulent inducement of the arbitration clause. However, this reasoning fails to
take into account that the UAA specifically speaks in terms of the irrevocability of
arbitration clauses, thus contemplating that the clause is distinct from the main
contract and therefore separable.
3. A Response to Other State Courts' Interpretationsof the UAA
Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UAA."' The

118. Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 917 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 412 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting)).
119. Id. at 917.
120. Cf Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P.2d 251,
258-60 (Cal. 1983) (en bane) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (discussing the notion that fraudulent inducement of
the main contract would void the arbitration clause).
121. The relevant s:atutes are codified at: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010 to 09.43.180 (Michie
1996); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to 12-1517 (West 1994); Arkansas, ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-108-201 to 16-108-224 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-22-201 to 13-22-223 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701 to
5725 (1975 & Supp. 1996); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4301 to 16-4319 (1989);
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Shaffer court comforted itself in noting that Tennessee, Louisiana, and Minnesota
have rejected the separability doctrine." However, by siding with these states, the
court placed itself in opposition to the decisions of the majority of states which have
adopted the UAA.In Therefore, the court disregarded the admonition of section
801 of Oklahoma's version of the UAA which states, "[t]his act shall be so
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws of those
states which enact it."'12
Perhaps more importantly, the court relied upon the decisions of other states as
a proxy for its own analysis of the separability doctrine. However, the reasons for
rejecting the separability doctrine provided in these cases have limitations which in
turn weaken the Shaffer rationale. The Shaffer court first relied upon City of Blaine
v. John Coleman Hayes & Associates, Inc.,' a Tennessee Court of Appeals case

Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 682.01 to 682.22 (West 1990); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 to 7-922
(1990); Illinois, 710 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 511 to 5/23 (West 1992); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-42-1 to 34-4-2-22 (Michie 1986); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 679A.1 to 679A.19 (West 1987); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 to 5-422 (1991 & Supp. 1996); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 417.045
to 417.240 (Banks-Baldwin 1991 & Supp. 1996); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927 to 5949
(West 1980); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN. CIS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1995 & Supp. 1996);
Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 251, §§ 1 to 19 (Law. Co-op. 1992); Michigan, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5001 to 600.5035 (West 1987); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 572.08 to 572.30
(West 1988); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 435.350 to 435.470 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); Montana,
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to 27-5-324 (1995); Nebraska, NEE. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to 25-2622
(1995); Nevada, NEv. REV.STAT.§§ 38.015 to 38.205 (1995); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 44-7I to 44-7-22 (Michie 1978); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to 1-567.20 (1983); North
Dakota, N.D. CENT.CODE §§ 32-29.2-01 to 32-29.2-20 (1996); Oklahoma, 15 OKLA.STAT. §§ 801-818
(1991); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301 to 7320 (1982); South Carolina, S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to 15-48-240 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1996); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 21-25A-1 to 21-25A-38 (Michie 1987); Tennessee, TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to 29-5-320 (Supp.
1996); Texas, TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001 to 171.020 (West Supp. 1997); Utah,
12, §§ 5651 to 5681
UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 78-31a-1 to 78-31a-20 (1996); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
(Supp. 1996); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.01 to 8.01-581.016 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996);
Wyoming, WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-36-101 to 1-36-119 (Michie 1977).
122. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 916-17. Apparently, the Shaffer court was not aware that a North
Carolina court has also rejected the separability doctrine. See T.J. Paramore v. Inter-Regional Fin. Group
Leasing Co., 316 S.E.2d 90, 92 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
123. The following states have adopted the separability doctrine under the UAA: Colorado, National
Camera, Inc. v. Love, 644 P.2d 94 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Idaho, Hansen v. State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co., 735 P.2d 974 (Idaho 1987); Illinois, Monical v. NCR Corp., 467 N.E.2d 644 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984); Indiana, Goebel v. Block and Marble Brand Toys, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991);
Massachusetts, Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., 400 N.E.2d 858 (Mass. 1980); Pennsylvania, Flightways
Corp. v. Keystone Helicopter Corp., 331 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1975); South Carolina, South Carolina Pub. Serv.
Auth. v. Great Western Coal, Inc., 437 S.E.2d 22 (S.C. 1993); Texas, Holk v. Biard, 920 S.W.2d 803
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996). The following states have adopted the separability doctrine but have not enacted
the UAA: California, Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Keamey & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P.2d
251 (Cal. 1983); New Jersey, Schneider, Inc. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1179 (W.D. Pa.
1979) (applying New Jersey law); New York, Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42 (N.Y. 1973).
124. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 801 (1991); see State exy rel. Tri-City Constr. Co. v. Marsh, 668 S.W.2d
148, 151 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (noting importance of the section in construing Missouri's version of the
UAA).
125. 818 S.W.2d 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
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from 1991. The court apparently cited the case in support of the proposition that
use of the separability doctrine would be contrary to the intent of the state
legislature when it enacted the UAA." The Blaine court focused on the same
section of the UAA as did the Shaffer court."z Reiterating, the section emphasized
the enforceability of arbitration clauses except "upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract."'"
The Blaine court rejected the separability doctrine by purporting to look at the
intent of the Tennessee legislature when it adopted the UAA."9 The court stated
that when the legislature adopted the Act, it was well aware that a party had a right
to seek recision of a contract which was induced by fraud.' Rather than going
any further with this analysis, the Blaine court merely adopted the reasoning of
Justice Black's dissent in Prima Paint to define the intent of the Tennessee
legislature, stating "[f]raud, of course, is one of the most common grounds for
revoking a contract. If the contract was procured by fraud, then, unless the
defrauded party elects to affirm it, there is absolutely no contract, nothing to be
arbitrated."''3
The Blaine analysis substituted Justice Black's understanding of the separability
doctrine for the intent of the Tennessee legislature. Shaffer, by analogy, would
appear to substitute it for that of the Oklahoma legislature. However, in neither case
were other possibilities discussed. What neither the Blaine nor Shaffer courts
considered was that the legislatures of their respective states might have also
understood that by adopting the UAA, they were overcoming judicial hostility
toward arbitration clauses and placing the clauses on an equal footing with other
contracts. 3 1 Therefore, the legislature contemplated that the arbitration clause is a
separate contract. Without an allegation of fraud directed at the arbitration clause
itself, the clause is valid and irrevocable.
Instead, by accepting Justice Black's analysis, the Blaine court made clear that if
a dispute arises ove: whether the contract was void ab initio, then the existence of
the arbitration clause, as a part of that contract, is also placed at issue, a question
properly decided by the courts. 3 1 However, such a view still does not address the

126. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 917 (citing Blaine, 818 S.W.2d at 38).
127. The Blaine court focused on TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302 (Supp. 1990) which, in relevant

part, is identical to 15 OKLA. STAT. § 802(A) (1991) as interpreted by the Shaffer court.
128. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302 (Supp. 1990).
129. See Blaine, 813 S.W.2d at 37-38.
130. See id. at 38.
131. Id.(quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 402,412 (1967) (Black,
J.,
dissenting)).

132. This was Congress' intent when it enacted the FAA. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1, 15-16 (1984) (citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)).
133. See also The Batter Bldg. Materials Co. v. Kirschner, 110 A.2d 464, 469 (Conn. 1954) ("[l]f
one party to the alleged contract is contending that it is void ab initio ... the arbitration clause cannot
operate, for.., the clau,e itself also is void"); Comment, Enforcement of Arbitration Clause Required
Although PrincipalContract Might Be Voidable, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 565, 567 (1968) ("Logically, it is
difficult to see how, if the entire contract is void, the arbitration clause can nevertheless be valid."). The
problem with this approach is that it assumes that the contract is void. However, when the question of
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issue of the parties' intent. Parties include arbitration clauses in contracts in order
to specify how they will settle disputes arising out of the contract, namely by
arbitration. Under this reasoning, to hold that the arbitration clause is inseparable
from the main contract and therefore unenforceable is to assume that the defendant
who allegedly fraudulently induced the main contract necessarily would have
fraudulently induced the arbitration clause. This rationale assumes too much,
frustrates the parties' intent, and narrows the class of arbitrable issues arising out of
a contract to those not pertaining to its formation."M
The Shaffer opinion also relied upon a Louisiana case for the view that the
validity of the arbitration clause is merely a corollary to the answer to whether the
main contract was valid.'35 In George Engine Co. v. Southern Shipbuilding
Corp., the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted a section of the state's arbitration statute 37 identical to the section' interpreted by the Shaffer court. The
George Engine court, in rejecting the separability doctrine, held that the statute did
not require a court to compel arbitration on the issue of whether the contract as a
whole was void ab initio 39 The court based its decision on the notion that a
question of fraudulent inducement requires adjudication of a legal issue, an issue
properly decided by a court; in contrast, arbitrators are more properly qualified to
decide factual issues. 14
Assuming that the George Engine reasoning is sound, and courts should decide
legal issues rather than arbitrators, this analysis fails to take into account the factual
nature of claims of fraud. The adjudication of allegations of fraud are indeed
questions of fact, and, according to the George Engine rationale, are therefore
properly determined by arbitrators. In Robert Lawrence Co. v. DevonshireFabrics,
Inc.,4 the Second Circuit addressed the sort of reasoning found in George Engine
when it stated that "[t]he issue of fraud seems inextricably enmeshed in the other
factual issues of the case. Indeed, the difference between fraud in the inducement
and mere failure of performance ...depends upon little more than legal verbiage

whether to enforce the arbitration clause arises, the evidence has not yet been presented, nor any legal
conclusion reached. Therefore, it is only possible that the contract is void. It is just as possible that the
contract and the arbitration clause included within the contract are valid and therefore enforceable.
134. Justice Mosk, of the California Supreme Court, arguing against application of the separability
doctrine, indicated that courts should also refuse to compel arbitration when other traditional contract
defenses such as duress, menace, undue influence or mistake are raised. Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy,
Keamey & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street, 673 P.2d 251, 260 (Cal. 1983) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
135. See Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910, 917 (Okla. 1996).
136. 350 So. 2d 881, 884 (La. 1977).
137. The section is presently codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4201 (West 1991). Lousiana has
not adopted the UAA.
138. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 802(A) (1991).
139. See George Engine, 350 So. 2d at 884.
140. See id. at 885-86; see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,41516 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[Courts have far more expertise in resolving legal issues which go
to the validity of a contract than do arbitrators.").
141. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
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and the formulation of legal conclusions."'" Further, while a court may reach a
legal conclusion when confronting a claim of fraud, arguably it would only be that

the plaintiffs complaint did or did not allege facts which, if true, would sustain a
finding by a trier of fact that the contract was induced by fraud.1 43 Finally, the

Oklahoma Supreme court itself, in Tice v. Tice," a 1983 case involving a claim
of fraudulent inducement of marriage, arguably a tort claim, clearly stated, "[w]hen
fraud is properly alleged by one party and denied by the other party, the existence
or non-existence of fraud becomes a question of fact."'4
The George Engine reasoning provides a weak basis for rejecting the separability
doctrine and actually frustrates the purposes of arbitration. Refusing to send a
matter to arbitration based simply upon a court's determination of the nature of the

claim, whether factual or legal, not only frustrates the parties' intent to have any
claims arising out of the contract arbitrated," but also allows a party to delay
arbitration. 47 Following this reasoning, a party may avoid arbitration by merely

alleging that the contract was void from its inception without addressing whether
the arbitration clause itself was fraudulently induced. However, the Shaffer court
followed the analysis, even going so far as to say that "[r]esolution of claims such
as fraud by those who are best suited to perform the task will enhance the
arbitration process."'"

142. ld.
at 410.
143. But see Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 3d 19, 29 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977), overruled or. other grounds by Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061
(Cal. 1996).
144. 672 P.2d 1168 (Okla. 1983).
145. Id. at 1171.
146. See George Engine Co. v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., 350 So. 2d 881 (La. 1977), in which
the dissenting judge stated:
Where the parties freely consent to arbitration of future disputes arising out of or relating
to a contract... the very purpose of their full consent to the arbitration agreement is to
avoid the expense, delays and uncertainties of litigation regarding the validity of either the
contractual undertaking itself or the contractual performance.
Id. at 887 (Tate, J., dissenting).
147. See id. (Tate, J., dissenting) ("To interpret the statutory language so, obviously opens up to
either party his unilateral option to postpone indefinite arbitration. He may do so, once an arbitrable
dispute arises, by filing ,judicial proceedings urging grounds for recession of the parent contract"); see
also Lumnus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1960), in which the court
stated:
We see no reason why parties should not agree, if they wish to, that if a question arises
as to whether the principal agreement was obtained by fraud, that that question will be
arbitrated. For r court to then hold that fraud which bore only upon the principal
agreement automatically invalidated the arbitration contract would be to destroy precisely
what the parties had sought to create. Moreover, any other approach sets the stage for
delaying action, nd invites the injured party to cast what is basically a claim for breach
of warranty cr failure to perform, which would be arbitrable, into an action based on
fraudulent inducement.
Id. at 924.
148. See Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910, 917 (Okla. 1996).
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Finally, the Shaffer court looked to the Minnesota Supreme Court's view of the
separability doctrine.'49 Relying upon Minnesota's supposed rejection of the
separability doctrine in Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp. of America,"° the Shaffer
court stated that "[tihe Minnesota Supreme Court has concluded as a matter of state
law that an arbitration agreement cannot be severed from the other contractual
provisions contained in a contract."' Actually, the Minnesota court held that the
arbitration clause in Atcas was severable.'" However, the court reasoned that the
issue of severability was not important since the parties had failed to evince a clear
intent in the arbitration clause to refer questions of fraud to arbitration.'"
For the Atcas court, the answer to whether the question of fraud in the
inducement of the contract was for the court or for the arbitrators turned not on a
hard, fast rule of separability or nonseparability such as that adopted in Shaffer.
Instead, the Atcas court focused on whether the language of the arbitration clause
was broad enough to include the question of fraud. The court articulated a twopronged test: "If the language contained in the agreement evinces an intent of the
parties to specifically arbitrate the issue of fraud or if the language used is
sufficiently broad to comprehend that the issue of fraudulent inducement be
arbitrated, then that issue is a proper subject for arbitration."'" This test has been
utilized by Minnesota courts to find that arbitration clauses were broad enough to
encompass the question of fraudulent inducement of the contract as a whole.' 55
Therefore, the Minnesota case relied upon in the Shaffer opinion does not
represent a statement that, under the UAA, arbitration clauses are never separable,
but rather that the question of arbitration of claims of fraudulent inducement will
often turn upon the latitude afforded by the language of the arbitration clause. This
was made clear in a recent Minnesota case in which one of the parties to a contract
specifically alleged fraud in the arbitration clause. Even courts adhering to the
separability doctrine would adjudicate this issue before compelling arbitration.
However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, rather than summarily adjudicating the
matter, first asked whether the arbitration clause in question was broad enough to
encompass the question.'" This view more accurately reflects the intent of the
parties when contracting for arbitration than does the Shaffer holding.

149. See id.
150. 197 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1972).
151. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 917.
152. See Atcas, 197 N.W.2d at 457.
153. See id. at 456.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. See Michael-Curry Cos., Inc. v. Knutson Shareholders Liquidating Trust, 449 N.W.2d 139, 14142 (Minn. 1989) (holding that an arbitration clause which stated "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out
of, or relating to this agreement, or the making, performance, or interpretation thereof, shall be settled
by arbitration" was sufficiently broad to satisfy the Atcas test); Welch v. Buller, 481 N.W.2d 856, 858-59
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that language of arbitration clause was broad enough to meet the Atcas
requirements). But see Thayer v. American Fin. Advisers, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599, 602-03 (Minn. 1982)
(holding that arbitration clause failed to meet the Atcas test).
156. See Heyer v. Moldenhauer, 538 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
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Rather than dealing with the reasons behind other courts' adoption of the
separability doctrine, the Shaffer court relied upon the reasons given by a few state
courts in rejecting the doctrine. However, in doing so, the Shaffer analysis is subject
to the weaknesses of those decisions. Most importantly, the court never addressed
the issue of the contracting parties' intent. Nor did the court analyze whether the
UAA envisioned the arbitration clause as a distinct contract. Instead, the court relied
upon a state court's interpretation of legislative intent, line drawing between factual
and legal issues, and an apparent misreading of a decision. None of these reasons
are sufficient for overlooking both the parties' intent and the plain language of the
UAA.
4. Shaffer and PriorStatements by the Oklahoma Supreme Court Regarding
Arbitration
Since the enactment of the UAA in Oklahoma in 1978, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has struggled, in various contexts, with the question of whether arbitration
clauses are enforceab.e.'" Recent decisions, however, have come down on the side
of enforceability.' Despite this, the Shaffer decision limited the enforceability of
arbitration clauses and thus stands in stark contrast to statements regarding
arbitration made in previous decisions.
At times, the court appeared to wholeheartedly favor the enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses. For example, in Voss v. City of Oklahoma City,'59 the
court upheld an arbitration agreement in the collective-bargaining context. In
contrast to the Shaffer analysis, the court clearly stated, "[tihe fundamental purpose
of arbitration is to preclude court intervention into the merits of disputes when
arbitration has been provided for contractually."'" The court added that "[w]here
arbitration has been contracted for, it constitutes a substantive and mandatory
right...61 Finally, the court stated that "[i]f the arbitration clause is broad enough
to include the alleged dispute, arbitration must be ordered."'62
Viewed in the light of this case and others like it, Shaffer would appear
anomalous. However, the decision makes more sense when placed in the context
of other decisions which have limited arbitration." These cases demonstrate that

157. See generally Shirley A. Wiegand, Arbitration Clauses: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly, 47
OKLA. L. REv. 619, 627-36 (1994) (discussing the court's treatment of arbitration clauses).
158. See Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Okla. 1996) (holding that predispute arbitration clauses are enforceable despite challenges based upon alleged violation of Oklahoma

Constitution).
159. 618 P.2d 925 (Ola. 1980).
160. Id.at 927.
161. Id. at 928.
162. Id. It should be rioted that many cases turn upon whether the court finds that the language of
arbitration clause was broad enough to cover the question of fraudulent inducement. Perhaps an
interpretation of the intent of parties to arbitrate claims of fraudulent inducementas manifested in the
arbitration clause would have offered a better solution to the problem before the Shaffer court. See supra
notes 154-56 and accompa-ying text.

163. Cf. Raines v. Ind.apendent School Dist. No. 6, 796 P.2d 303 (Okla. 1990) (refusing to enforce
arbitration clause in collective bargaining agreement; Mindemann v. Independent School Dist. No. 6, 771
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while the Oklahoma Supreme Court may favor arbitration in the abstract, the
majority will often find a way to refuse enforcement in the particular. For example,
in Cannon v. Lane," the court held that an agreement between a Health Maintenance Organization (lIMO) and a participant which included an arbitration
agreement was not governed by the UAA as it resembled a "contract with reference
to insurance" which is not covered by the Act.'" The court held that arbitration
in that instance was governed by Oklahoma's common law.'" As a result, the
arbitration clause was unenforceable as a matter of public policy.'
Perhaps most important is the concern of whether the enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses violates the Oklahoma Constitution." Article 2, section 6 states
that "[t]he courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy
and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person,
property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial, delay, or prejudice."" Also, article 23, section 8 states that "[a]ny
provision of a contract, express or implied, made by any person, by which any of
the benefits of this Constitution is sought to be waived, shall be null and void."'70
The question of whether the enforcement of arbitration clauses violates these
provisions has been consistently raised by Justice Opala." The concern has
apparently been, for the time being, lain to rest in Rollings v. Thermodyne
Industries, Inc." in which the court held that enforcement of arbitration clauses
did not violate the Oklahoma Constitution."
Despite the court's recent willingness to favor arbitration in general, as evidenced
in Rollings, the court's history of finding reasons to refuse to enforce arbitration

P.2d 996 (Okla. 1989) (denying enforcement of arbitration clause in collective bargaining agreement).
These decisions did not interpret the UAA but are important in that they demonstrate the court's
reluctance to enforce arbitration clauses. See also Wiegand, supra note 157, at 636 (arguing that the
Raines and Mindemann decisions reflected the court's continued hostility toward arbitration).
164. 867 P.2d 1235 (Okla. 1993). See generally Rick Eckerson, Note, Cannon v. Lane: Did Cannon
Mortally Wound ArbitrationProvisionsin HMO SubscriberAgreements?, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 587 (1994)
(discussing the Cannon decision and its ramifications for arbitration in the context of Health Maintenance

Organizations (HMOs)).
165. Cannon, 867 P.2d at 1237. The statutory exception relied upon by the court is found at 15
OKLA. STAT. § 802(A) (1991), which excludes from the UAA's coverage contracts relating to insurance.
166. See Cannon, 867 P.2d at 1238.

167. See id at 1239.
168. Cf. State v. Nebraska Ass'n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. 1991) (holding that
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses under Nebraska arbitration statute violated the state's

constitution).
169. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
170. OKLA. CONST. art XXIII, § 8.
171. See Shaffer v. Jeffrey, 915 P.2d 910, 919 (Okla. 1996) (Opala, J., dissenting); Rollings v.
Thermodyne Indus., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030, 1037 (Okla. 1996) (Opala, J., concurring); Massey v. Farmers
Ins. Group, 837 P.2d 880, 885 (Okla. 1992) (Opaia, C.J., concurring); Raines v. Independent School Dist.
No. 6, 796 P.2d 303, 304 (Okla. 1990) (Opala, V.CJ., concurring); Long v. DeGeer, 753 P.2d 1327,
1330 (Okla. 1987) (Opala, J., concurring).
172. 910 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1996).
173. See id. at 1035-36.
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clauses in particular situations, as demonstrated by the Cannon decision, may
provide insight into why they refused to enforce the arbitration clause at issue in
Shaffer. This is because Shaffer did not involve the usual commercial contract, but
rather a fee agreement between an attorney and his clients. There has been debate
over whether a lawyer violates his ethical duties by providing for arbitration of
disputes arising out of his relationship with his client. 4 The Shaffer court
indicated that it was at least aware of this issue when it hinted at the specifics of
the plaintiffs' situation. The court stated, "The parties do not raise, and we need not
address, the propriety of an arbitration clause in an attorney fee agreement, or
whether circumstances could exist that would void an arbitration clause in an
attorney fee agreement."'75
Instead, the parties in Shaffer had alleged that the arbitration clause violated the
Oklahoma Constitution.'76 However, the court had put that question to rest in the
Rollings decision. Since the parties did not raise the specific issue of whether the
ethical dilemmas surrounding arbitration in the attorney-client context might be a
sufficient reason for voiding the arbitration clause, the court never explicitly
addressed the question. Instead, the court sided with the plaintiffs by refusing to
compel arbitration because of the reason that they did raise - a rejection of the
separability doctrine..
Thus, at first glance, it would appear that the court's recognition of the issue of
arbitration in the attorney-client context was irrelevant to the decision it reached.
However, in noting the peculiar nature of the case, despite the fact that neither party
raised the issue, the court may have been making a thinly veiled expression of its
disapprobation of the practice of inserting arbitration clauses in attorney-client fee
agreements as a possible attempt to limit the lawyer's liability in case of malpractice. " This may have provided the impetus for denying arbitration.
This view is supported by the fact that the court may have preferred to limit its
rejection of the separability doctrine to the context of attorney-client fee agreements.
For instance, the court stated the issue placed before it in terms of whether claims
of fraud in the inducement of the "attorney-client" contract would preclude
enforcement of the arbitration clause. In announcing its holding, the court spoke
in terms of attorney-client contracts, stating "allegations of fraud in the inducement
of the attorney-client contract or agreement generally ...must be resolved by a
court prior to either compelling arbitration or dismissing the case."'' This
indicates that the court would have liked to have confined its holding to attorneyclient agreements, or at least that the specifics of the plaintiffs' situation figured in
their decision. However, since the parties never raised the issue of whether the

174. See Jane Massey Draper, Annotation, Validity and ConstructionofAgreement Between Attorney
and Client to Arbitrate Disputes Arising Between Them, 26 A.L.R.5th 107 (1995).
175. Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 913 n.2.
176. See id. at 912.
177. See OKLA. R. PROF. CONDUCr 1.8(h) ("A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively
limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for the lawyer's personal malpractice").
178. See Shaffer. 915 P.2d at 914.
179. Id. at 917.
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ethical complications surrounding arbitration clauses in attorney-client agreements
would be sufficient reason to make them voidable, the court refused arbitration
based upon the only reason raised by the parties, specifically, the separability
doctrine. While arbitration in the context of attorney-client fee agreements is
problematic and may indeed violate an attorney's ethical obligations,"m the Shaffer
holding, by not dealing with the issue, could not be confined to the attorney-client
context. Instead, the court dealt with a contracts issue and, therefore, logically
extended its holding to contracts in general.' It will be in the field of commercial
contracts that the holding will have its greatest impact. However, in commercial
contracts, the obligations attending the special relationship between an attorney and
his client such as existed in Shaffer simply do not apply. If anything, the holding
should have been limited to arbitration clauses in attorney-client fee agreements.
The language of the Shaffer decision seems to leave open this possibility, and
perhaps a future decision will so limit the court's rejection of the separability
doctrine."
The Shaffer decision represents a step back in the enforceability of arbitration
clauses under Oklahoma state law. However, the decision is not such a radical
opinion when viewed in light of the court's struggle with arbitration in general. The
court indicated in prior decisions that while it favored arbitration, it would not
enforce arbitration clauses if it thought that a mere technicality might deprive a
party of his right to access to the courts. Perhaps the court saw Shaffer as a close
call due to the attorney-client relationship which had existed when the contract was
made and came down on the side of the right of access to the courts. However, its
impact will be most widely felt in the commercial context, and therefore the
decision is lamentable.
D. The Impact of the Rejection of the SeparabilityDoctrine on Arbitration in
Oklahoma
Shaffer makes clear that Oklahoma state courts will not enforce the separability
doctrine in cases governed by the UAA. Thus, if a party alleges fraud in the
inducement of a contract containing an arbitration clause, Oklahoma courts applying
state law will not enforce arbitration of the issue but will instead resolve the matter
in court." However, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Prima
180. See Mark G. Anderson, Note, ArbitrationClauses in RetainerAgreements:A Lawyer's License
to Exploit the Client, 1992 J. DIsp. REsOL. 341 (discussing ethical problems involved with allowing
lawyers to insert arbitration clauses in fee agreements).
181. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 918; see also Patricia Ledvina Himes, New Oklahoma Supreme Court
Decisions Regarding Arbitration - Sustaining Constitutionality and Expanding the Role of District
Courts, 67 OKLA. B.J. 2887, 2890-91 (1996) ("[l]f a plaintiff alleges fraud in the inducement of the
arbitration clause itself or the underlying agreement, the district court must adjudicate that issue before
granting any relief based upon the validity of the arbitration clause").
182. The court might consider Renegar v. Staples, 388 P.2d 867, 871-72 (Okla. 1963) (noting
special relationship in attorney-client context when fraud is alleged), and Renegarv. Fleming, 211 P.2d
272, 277-78 (Okla. 1949) (discussing unenforceability of fraudulently induced agreements between
attorney and client).
183. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 917.
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PainteU makes it equally clear that Oklahoma state courts deciding a case under
the FAA are required to follow the separability doctrine. Applying the FAA, the
court will treat the arbitration clause as a separate contract and enforce arbitration
on the question of whether the underlying contract was fraudulently induced.'
The bifurcation of federal and state arbitration law in Oklahoma courts by the
Shaffer decision creates a problem. The FAA applies in both federal and state
courts whenever the contract evidences an involvement with interstate commerce. " However, the FAA does not provide, as a federal question, an independent ground for subject-matter jurisdiction in the federal courts.I" Parties invoking
federal court jurisdiction by way of diversity will likely have entered into a contract
involving interstate commerce and will therefore be able to take advantage of the
FAA. However, nondiverse parties whose contractual dispute raises no federal
question will have to bring their case in state court. Therefore, whether their claim
is governed by the UAA or the FAA will depend upon whether their contract
involves interstate commerce. If the defendant was fortunate enough to have entered
into a contract with a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to invoke the FAA,
he will be able to enforce arbitration of claims of fraudulent inducement of the
contract. If not, he will be subject to the UAA and the holding in Shaffer.
Arbitrability of claims should not be subject to fortuity of circumstances but rather
whether the parties intended to arbitrate their disputes.
Therefore, the likely impact of the decision will be that future contracting parties
who wish to ensure arbitration of disputes will make certain that their contract in
some way demonstrates an involvement with interstate commerce in order to take
advantage of the protection of the FAA. Parties may even go so far as to include
the FAA in a choice-of-law provision. Fewer and fewer contracts will be governed
by the UAA. The result could be the withering of the UAA and the almost
complete federalization of arbitration law in Oklahoma.
I1. The Other Problem with Shaffer: Opting
Out of Governance by Federal Law
A. The FatalFlaw of Shaffer: A Logical Trap and the Trouble with Federalism
Had the Shaffer court merely rejected the separability doctrine, the case would
have a limited impact. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that the
FAA applies to all cases involving interstate commerce whether brought in federal

184. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).

185. See i. at 403-04.
186. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
187. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) states, in relevant part, that arbitration may be compelled by a federal court
which, "save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty
of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties." See also Moses H.
Cone Meml Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,25 n.32 (1983) (noting that FAA creates no

independent grounds for federal jurisdiction); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 420 (1967) (Black, S., dissenting) (stating legislative history of FAA indicated that it was not
intended to create federal subject-matter jurisdiction).
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or state court."s Oklahoma courts have followed this rule."s Therefore, Shaffer's
rejection of the separability doctrine would have applied only to those cases
governed by the UAA, specifically, those cases which did not involve interstate
commerce.
However, the Shaffer court broadened the scope of the UAA at the expense of
federal arbitration law. The court stated that parties could, through a choice-of-law
provision, choose to have their case arbitrated under the UAA rather than the FAA
even if the case involved interstate commerce.'" While Oklahoma courts have
previously expressly declined to consider whether the FAA preempted the UAA
when neither party raised the issue,"' the rule set forth by the Shaffer court
indicates that even if a party does raise the issue, the FAA will not preempt state
law when selected in a choice-of-law provision.
However, it is not altogether clear that this is possible. The decision raises two
problems, First, choice-of-law provisions are intended to allow parties to choose
between the laws of different states. Choice-of-law provisions are clearly not
intended to allow parties to choose between state and applicable federal law." By
allowing parties to select the UAA in a choice-of-law provision, the Shaffer decision
allows parties to simply choose not to be governed by federal law. It is unlikely that
Congress enacted the FAA intending that its scope would be determined by how
many parties wanted to fall within its coverage.
Second, Shaffer's rejection of the separability doctrine contains an unmistakable
logical inconsistency which would preclude enforcement of the choice-of-law
provision in cases involving alleged fraudulent inducement of a contract. While the
court held that an allegation of fraudulent inducement of the main contract rendered
the arbitration clause unenforceable," the court never questioned whether the
choice-of-law provision contained within that arbitration clause might also have
been tainted by fraud. Also, while the court proved unwilling to abide the parties'
intent to arbitrate, it was willing to enforce the parties' intent as to which law would
govern. However, it is wholly unreasonable to assume that the parties would intend
arbitration to be governed by state law, when that law would ultimately preclude
arbitration in the first place."94

188. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12, 16 (1984).
189. See Southern Okla. Health Care Corp. v. JHBR, 900 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Okla.Ct. App. 1995).
190. See Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910, 915 n.10 (Okla. 1996). The court expressly declined to
consider the preemptive effect of the FAA despite choice-of-law clauses in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
v. Shear, 796 P.2d 296, 298 n.8 (Okla. 1990).
191. See Williams v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 917 P.2d 998, 1002 n.5 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995).
192. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 490 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Choice-of-law clauses simply have never been used for the
purpose of dealing with the relationship between state and federal law").
193. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 917-18.
194. See Zhaodong Jiang, FederalArbitrationLaw and State Court Proceedings,23 LoYoLA L.A.
L. REV. 473 (1990) in which the author stated:
To suggest, on the one hand, that the parties had expressed their willingness to arbitrate
their future disputes, but on the other hand, intended the validity and enforceability of
their arbitration clause to be governed by a particular state rule that would invalidate the
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The court refused to separate the arbitration clause from the main contract, but
was clearly willing to separate the choice-of-law provision from both."'s Not
coincidentally, the enforcement of the choice-of-law provision took the case out of
the ambit of the FAA and conferred upon the Oklahoma Supreme Court the ability
to decide a question in an area increasingly governed by the federal law."
B. The Problem With Choosing Between State and FederalLaw
According to Shaffer, if contracting parties provide that the UAA will govern
arbitration of any future disputes in a choice-of-law provision, Oklahoma state
courts must apply the UAA even if the contract involves interstate commerce and
falls within the coverage of the FAA.'" This means that courts may reach the odd
result of enforcing a choice-of-law provision in an arbitration agreement which
selects a body of law that precludes arbitration altogether. Further, the statement
means that parties may simply opt not to be governed by federal law. However, the
United States Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the broad scope of the FAA
and a brief look at these decisions makes clear that the Shaffer court's statement was
in error.
The applicability of the FAA in state and federal courts has proven a difficult
issue. 9 Almost immediately after the statute's enactment, courts held that the
FAA did not create an independent ground of federal subject-matter jurisdiction by
way of a federal cuestion.'" The courts did conclude, however, that the statute
was applicable in diversity cases.n Conversely, there was little indication that the
statute applied in state courts." t
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins' in 1938, the issue surrounding the applicability of the FAA could be
articulated as whether the statute was essentially substantive or procedural law. Erie
mandated that federal courts sitting in diversity were to apply the substantive law
of the forum state?' Therefore, if the FAA were construed as substantive law,

arbitration claure would be unreasonable. Arbitration agreements would be defeated too
easily under the vagaries of state law whenever the parties refer to state law. As a matter
of policy, choice-of-law provisions should not be interpreted as intending to displace the

application of federal law to arbitration agreements.
Id. at 491.
195. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 915 n.10.
196. See generally Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce
Requirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HoFSTRA L. REv. 385 (1992) (discussing the
increasing scope of the FAA at the expense of state arbitration law).
197. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 915 n.10.
198. See John P. Luddington, Annotation, Conflict of Laws as to Validity and Effect of Arbitration

Provision in Contractfor Purchase or Sale of Goods, Products, or Services, 95 A.L.R.3d 1145 (1979
& Supp. 1996).

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See Hirshman, supra note 30, at 1318-19.
See Strickland, supra note 196, at 391.
See id
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See id. at 78.
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federal courts would not apply the FAA in diversity cases but rather the arbitration
law of the forum state. The FAA would have been a virtual nullity.
Though far from clear, it appeared that the FAA was procedural.' While this
would have resulted in application of the FAA in diversity cases, another landmark
case dealt the FAA a blow. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York"5 in 1945, the Court
rephrased the question in terms of whether application of federal rather than state
law would significantly affect the outcome of the decision.
If it would, federal
courts were to apply state law.' Therefore, even if the FAA were considered
procedural law, since its application would likely be "outcome-determinative" in
light of states' disfavor toward arbitration, the federal courts would be precluded
from applying it.'
The crux of the problem lay in whether Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to
its Article DI power or instead relied upon its power to regulate interstate
commerce.' If Congress enacted the FAA under its Article IT authority over the
federal courts and intended it to apply only in the federal courts as a rule of
procedure, then it would only apply in those courts."' Further, as a rule of
procedure, it would not offend the Erierule of applying state substantive and federal
procedural law in diversity cases."' However, if Congress enacted the FAA under
its power to regulate interstate commerce, then the statute would have a much
broader reach and apply in both federal and state courts.2 2
In Bernhardtv. Polygraphic Co. of America"' in 1956, the Court effectively
closed any discussion on one of the possibilities when it found that enforcement of
arbitration clauses under the FAA would violate the Guaranty Trust rule. In a
diversity case, the court chose to apply state rather than federal law, since
application of the FAA would substantially affect the outcome of the case.2 4
Therefore, in Guaranty Trust terms, the FAA would be essentially substantive rather
than procedural. 15 Thus, the Article I possibility of a federal procedural rule
faded and application of the FAA in diversity cases was again doubtful. As one
author has noted, short of overturning Erie, the only option remaining for broad
application of the FAA rested in squaring the enactment of the statute with
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce.216

204. See Janet Lee Herold, Note, Federal Arbitration Act Creates National Substantive Law
Applicable in Federaland State Courts and Supersedes ContraryState Statutes, 54 Miss. L.J. 571, 575

(1984).
205. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id.
at 109.
See id.
See Herold, supra note 204, at 575-76.
See Strickland, supranote 196, at 392; Hirshman, supra note 30, at 1314-17.
See Strickland, supranote 196, at 392.
See Hirshman, supra note 30, at 1316.
See Strickland, supra note 196, at 392.
350 U.S. 198 (1956).
See id. at 202-03.
See Hirshman, supra note 30, at 1320.
See id,
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2 7
in 1967.
The broad reach of the statute was firmly established in Prima Paint
There, the Court held that the FAA presented no Erie-GuarantyTrust problem in
diversity cases because Congress enacted the statute under its commerce clause
authority 1 8 After Prima Paint, it was clear that the reach of the FAA had
expanded. Federal courts would apply the FAA in diversity cases whenever the
contract involved interstate commerce. While the FAA did not provide an
independent ground for federal subject-matter jurisdiction as a federal question,1 9
it had indeed begun to expand its reach.
However, the question remained whether state courts were required to apply the
FAA in cases in which the contract involved interstate commerce. The answer came
in Southland Corp. v. Keating' in 1984. In Southland, the Court held that the
FAA was national substantive law applicable in both federal and state courts.22'
The Court reaffirmed the PrimaPaintanalysis of the FAA and stated that Congress
enacted the statute under its commerce clause authority.tm Therefore, following
the Southland decision, any time a contract involved interstate commerce, the FAA
governed, whether suit was brought in federal or state court.
The Court's latest comment on the scope of the FAA came in 1995 with AlliedBruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson.' In Allied-Bruce, the Court expanded the
reach of the FAA even further when it adopted the "commerce-in-fact" test for
whether the contract involved interstate commerce, thus triggering application of the
statute.' Under this interpretation of "involving" commerce, so long as the
transaction turns out to have, in fact, involved commerce, it is of no importance that
the parties did not ccntemplate a connection with interstate commerce when they
entered into the contract.' The Court stated that the words "involving commerce"
were the functional equivalent of "affecting commerce" and demonstrated Congress'
intent to use its Commerce Clause power to the full.'
This line of cases demonstrates the FAA's broad scope. The Shaffer court
recognized the Southland rule that the FAA preempts state arbitration law in cases

217. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
218. See id. at 404-05. The Court relied upon legislative history, citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1
(1924). See id.
219. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
220. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
221. See id. at 12. That the FAA was applicable in both state and federal courts was stated
somewhat less explicitly ina previous decision. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-36 & n.34 (1983).
222. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 11.
223. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). See generally Janet M. Grossnickle, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson:How the FederalArbitrationAct Will Keep Consumersand CorporationsOut of the Courtroom,
36 B.C. L. REv. 769 (1995) (discussing implications of the Allied-Bruce decision).
224. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281.
225. See id. at 277. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, rejected the competing "contemplation of
the parties" test as articulat.-d by Judge Lumbard in Metro Indus. PaintingCorp. v. Terminal Constr. Co.,
287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring). See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277.
226. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273.
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involving interstate commerce.m Under Allied-Bruce this would include almost
every case.' Despite the reach of the FAA as articulated in this line of decisions,
the Shaffer court ruled that even if the FAA applies, state arbitration rules govern
when agreed to by the parties. 9 The Shaffer court cited American Physicians
Service Group, Inc. v. Port Lavaca Clinic Associates,' a 1992 Texas Court of
Appeals case, for this proposition that parties may, through a choice-of-law
provision, select to have arbitration governed entirely by state arbitration rules.'
As the court indicated, the authority for this statement was taken from the United
States Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board
of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University. 2 However, both the American
Physiciansand Shaffer courts fundamentally misapprehended the Volt decision and
allowed parties not only to select to be governed by state procedural rules of
arbitration which did not affect their ultimate right to arbitration, but also to be
subject to state arbitration law which would preclude the enforceability of arbitration
clauses in general.
A closer look at the Volt decision will make clear the court's misunderstanding.
In Volt, the parties had included a choice-of-law provision which stated that the law
of the place where the contract was performed would govern. 3 When the plaintiff
sued, the defendant moved to compel arbitration.'m However, the plaintiff moved
to stay arbitration pursuant to a California arbitration ruleP5 which allowed a court
to stay arbitration pending the resolution of related litigation between one of the
parties to the agreement and third parties.' Since the contract was performed in
California, the Court faced the question of whether to enforce the choice-of-law
provision and apply the California arbitration rule or whether the rule was
preempted by the FAA.
Despite finding that the contract fell within the coverage of the FAA, 7 the
Court held that the FAA did not preempt the state arbitration rule. 8 The Court
first stated that the purpose underlying Congress' enactment of the FAA was its
desire to overrule the judiciary's hostility toward arbitration. 29 However, the Court
made clear that "[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set
of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability,

227. See Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910, 915 n.10 (Okla. 1996).
228. See Grossnickle, supranote 223, at 790 (citing Mr. Mudd, Inc. v. Petra Tech, Inc., 892 S.W.2d
389, 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), in which the court held that the use of the United States Postal Service
satisfied the Allied-Bruce interstate commerce test for the application of the FAA).
229. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 915 n.10.
230. 843 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
231. See Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 915 n.10.
232. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
233. See id. at 470.
234. See id. at 471.
235. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1281.2(c) (West 1982).
236. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 471.

237. See id. at 476.
238. See id. at 477, 479.
239. See id. at 474.
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according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate."' The Court reasoned
that application of the California rule would not undermine the policies behind the
FAA, stating:
Interpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable state rules
governing the conduct of arbitration - rules which are manifestly
designed to encourage resort to the arbitral process - simply does not
offend the rule of liberal construction set forth in Moses H. Cone,[ ]
nor does it offend any other policy embodied in the FAA.u2
The Court stated that the FAA preempts state laws which "require a judicial forum
for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties have agreed to resolve by
arbitration. 'U3 However, the FAA does not "prevent[] the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act
itself."2
Therefore, Volt stands for the proposition that parties may agree to abide by state
procedural rules of arbitration which only affect the logistics of the arbitration
process but do not undermine the FAA's policy of enforcing arbitration clauses.
Despite a choice-of-law provision, the FAA will still preempt any state law which
precludes the ultimate enforcement of the arbitration clause 5 as this conflicts with
the federal policy ensuring the enforceability of arbitration agreements.' In Volt,
the Court was willing to avoid preemption and enforce the California rule because
it merely stayed arbitration pending the resolution of related claims. The rule did
not affect the ultimate enforceability of the arbitration clause.
However, the Shaffer court, by relying upon American Physicians, misread the
Volt decision. The Shaffer court used the holding in American Physicians, and
implicitly the holding in Volt, to state that if parties include a choice-of-law
provision in an arbitration clause, that law will govern even if its application could
potentially result in a court's refusal to enforce the clause, as well it did in Shaffer.
However, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Volt simply does not lend
itself to the notion that parties may choose altogether not to be governed by the
FAA.

240. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
241. The rule of statutory construction that the Court referenced was set forth in Moses H. Cone
Mem'lHosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). The case is cited most often for the following
statement regarding the construction courts should give to arbitration agreements governed by the FAA:
"[Als a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration." Id.at 24-25.
242. Volt, 489 U.S. at 476.
243. Id at 478 (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
244. Id. at 479.
245. See hi at 477. The court stated that "[e]ven when Congress has not completely displaced state
regulation in an area, state law may nonetheless be preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with
federal law - that is, to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress'" Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).

246. See id.
at 476.
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This misunderstanding of the Volt distinction between procedural rules of
arbitration and state law which would preclude enforcement is made clear by a
closer examination of American Physicians. In American Physicians,ul the parties
included a choice-of-law provision in their arbitration clause which stated that any
disputes would be settled according to Texas law?'
The trial court refused to enforce the arbitration clause since it did not comply
with the substantive requirements of the Texas Arbitration Act as it was not
underlined and printed on the first page of the contract.u The defendants
appealed, arguing that the Texas Arbitration Act was preempted by the FAA. The
Texas Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument, holding that since the
arbitration clause specifically stated in a choice-of-law provision that any disputes
would be arbitrated under Texas law, the Texas statute was not preempted by
federal law?' The American Physicians court quoted Volt:
Where... the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration,
enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully
consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go
forwardY'
There is no question that American Physicianswas wrongly decided. The court
essentially held that the FAA did not preempt the Texas arbitration statute even
though enforcement of the Texas law precluded the enforcement of the arbitration
clause. This is due to the court's misunderstanding of Volt.
This misunderstanding was made abundantly clear by the United States Supreme
Court in Doctor'sAssociates,Inc. v. Casarotto. In Casarotto,the Court held that
a section of Montana's version of the UAA, identical to the section at issue in
American Physicians, was preempted by the FAA because, by its application,
enforceability of arbitration was precluded.' Justice Ginsburg distinguished Volt,
pointing out that:
Volt involved an arbitration agreement that incorporated state procedural
rules, one of which, on the facts of that case, called for arbitration to be
stayed pending the resolution of a related judicial proceeding. The state
rule examined in Volt determined only the efficient order of the
proceedings; it did not affect the ultimate enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself'z

247. American Physicians Serv. Corp., Inc. v. Port Cavaca Clinic Assocs., 843 S.W.2d 675 (Tex.

App. - Corpus Chrisi 1992, writ denied).
248. See idL at 676 n.l.
249. See id. at 677.
250. See id. at 678.
251. Id. (quoting Volt Inflo. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).

252. 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
253. See id. at 1657.
254. Id. at 1656-57.
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Like Casarotto and American Physicians, Shaffer did not involve a procedural

rule of arbitration a; set forth in the UAA. Rather, it involved the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 802(A) of the UAA, a substantive

provision almost identical to section 2 of the FAA. The decision did not involve the
logistics of the proceedings but rather the ultimate enforceability of the arbitration
clause. us Therefore, despite the fact that the parties in Shaffer selected the UAA

as the law governing arbitration, since the Act's application resulted in the court's
refusal to enforce the arbitration clause via the separability doctrine, the Shaffer
court's interpretation of the UAA contravened the policy of the FAA and should

have been preempted by the federal Act.
Since the Volt decision, numerous courts and commentators' have pointed out
the distinction between state procedural rules which do not affect the ultimate
enforceability of the arbitration clause and inconsistent state law which would
preclude enforcement. For instance, in Ackerberg v. Johnson," the Eighth Circuit
stated:
Volt thus holds that the parties to an arbitration agreement can agree

that state rules concerning arbitration will govern their proceedings. It
clearly does not hold that state law can determine whether any given
claim is arbitrable under the Federal Arbitration Act. Whether a claim
is arbitrable under federal law is not a procedural question, and Volt
clearly relies on this distinction .... The Supreme Court did not hold
that state law could prevent arbitration of a federal claim otherwise
arbitrable under federal law 9

255. Whether to enforce arbitrations via the separability doctrine is not a procedural question. As
one author has noted, "the cecision whether to apply the doctrine of separability involves the substantive
issue of the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement with regard to attacks upon container
contracts." Jiang, supra note 194, at 506.
256. Cf. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), in which the Court stated:
[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to
govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts
generally. A state faw principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a
contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with... § 2.
Id. at 492 n.9. See generally William G. Phelps, Annotation, Pre-emption by FederalArbitrationAct of
State Laws Prohibitingor RestrictingFormationor Enforcement of ArbitrationAgreements, 108 A.L.R.
FED. 179 (1992 & Supp. 1996) (discussing preemption by FAA of state arbitration law).
257. See Zhaodong Jirng, FederalArbitration Right, Choice-of-Law Clauses and State Rules and
Procedure, 22 Sw. U. L. REv. 159 (1992) (discussing exhaustively the ramifications of the Volt
decision); Arthur S. Feldman, Note, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University: Confusing Federalismwith FederalPolicy Under the FAA, 69 TEX. L. REV.
691, 692-93 (1991) (arguing that Volt should be limited to "situations where the courts can inject
complementary state-created procedural devices into the overall scheme of judicial enforceability of
arbitration agreements without offending the more clearly defined policies of the FAA"); Faith A.
Kaminsky, ArbitrationLaw. Choice-of-Law Clausesand the Power to Choose Between State and Federal
Law, 1991 ANN. SuRv. AM. LAW 527 (discussing choice-of-law clauses and preemption of state
arbitration law by the FAA).
258. 892 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1989).
259. Id. at 1334.
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Similarly, in the context of judicial review of arbitrators' decisions, the Fifth Circuit
made clear that the FAA will apply despite any choice-of-law provision selecting
state law. In Atlantic Aviation, Inc. v. EBM Group, Inc., the court unequivocally

stated that "the FAA governs judicial review of arbitration proceedings notwithstanding any choice of law provision or state law to the contrary."'" Both before and
after the Volt decision, this view was consistently held in federal' and state
courts.'
It is clear that the Shaffer court misstated the holding in Volt when it held that
"even when the federal act applies state arbitration rules govern when agreed to by
the parties."' The Volt decision only allowed parties to choose state procedural
rules which did not affect the ultimate enforceability of the arbitration clause.
However, the Shaffer court misread this to mean that parties could choose to be
governed by state substantive arbitration law, the application of which could
potentially result in the ultimate preclusion of arbitration.
C. The Logical Trap

In circumventing the application of the FAA by enforcing a choice-of-law
provision, the Shaffer court created for itself a logical trap. If fraud potentially so

260. 11 F.3d 1276 (5th Cir. 1994).
261. Id. at 1280.
262. See Appalachian Reg'l Healtheare, Inc. v. Beyt, Rish, Robbins Group, Architects, No. 91-6063,
1992 WL 107014, at *2 (6th Cir. May 19, 1992) (holding that choice-of-law provision does not require
application of state law rather than FAA); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056,
1062 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that FAA rather than state law applied despite selection of state law in
choice-of-law provision); Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d
238, 243-44 (5th Cir. 1986) ("The fact that the parties intended arbitration under Louisiana law does not
affect the question of arbitrability .... [Tihe existence of commerce under the FAA is dispositive with
respect to the law which governs arbitrability even where the parties contemplated state law
governance"); Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1982)
("Notwithstanding the parties' choice of law provision in their contract calling for application of Illinois
law, and irrespective of the fact that this is a diversity case, federal arbitration law governs the analysis
of arbitration provisions in any contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce"); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1976) ("To permit the parties to
contract away the application of the Act by adopting state law to govern their agreement would be
inconsistent with the Act itself and the holding in Prima Paint"); Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp.,
467 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 1972) ("[T]he Federal Act bars resort to state arbitration rules to determine
the validity of arbitration clauses in interstate contracts"); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.
v. Gregg, No. 93-177-CIV-OC-16, 1993 WL 616691, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 1993) ("The [Volt] Court
did not declare that all choice-of-law provisions automatically invoked the chosen state's arbitration
law"); Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 151, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Volt does not
stand for the proposition that any time a choice-of-law provision is included in an arbitration agreement,
such a provision necessarily requires the application of state, rather than federal, arbitration law"), affd
in partand rev'd in part, 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991).
263. See generally Sentry Systems, Inc. v. Guy, 654 P.2d 1008 (Nev. 1982) (despite choice-of-law
provision in favor of California law, court applied FAA since agreement contemplated interstate
commerce); Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp., 512 P.2d 751 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (although choice-oflaw clause provided for arbitration to be governed under New York law, court applied FAA).
264. Shaffer v. Jeffery, 915 P.2d 910, 915 n.10 (Okla. 1996).
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pervaded the contra.ct as to render the arbitration clause unenforceable without
judicial resolution of the issue, would fraud not have also touched the choice-of-law
provision? The choice-of-law provision was certainly important. Courts have noted
the importance contracting parties place in the somewhat analogous forum-selection
clause. At least in the context of international arbitration, the United States Supreme
Court stated in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., "the forum clause was a
vital part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did
not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the
consequences of the forurm clause figuring prominently in their calculations."'
Certainly, the same logic would apply equally as forcefully to the selection of which
law, federal or state, would govern. Perhaps more importantly, it appears strange
that a court would seek to give effect to the parties' choice of state law when that
law would preclude arbitration.
In short, why would the Shaffer court, which refused to accord any credence to
an arbitration clause when the existence of the main contract was at issue, accord
without question credence to the choice-of-law provision included therein? The
answer is simple. Were the court to have held that the choice-of-law provision was
unenforceable, it is quite probable that under Allied-Bruce, the FAA would have
applied and arbitration enforced according to federal law. By refusing to recognize
the validity of the arbitration clause, yet at the same time recognizing the validity
of its choice of law provision, the Shaffer court allowed itself to decide the case
under state rather than federal law. Ironically, the same court which stated that the
"[p]laintiffs in our cases today do not seek to uphold any provision of the fee
agreements,"' simultaneously upheld a provision of the fee agreement which took
the case out of the ambit of the FAA and conferred upon the court the ability to use
state law to strike a blow to the enforceability of arbitration clauses in Oklahoma.'
D. PotentialImpact
The impact of the second holding in Shaffer could ironically be that fewer cases
in Oklahoma courts will be governed by the UAA. While the rule handed down was
apparently an attempt to stem the encroachment of federal arbitration law, the effect
could be quite the opposite. Contracting parties who wish to ensure arbitration of
any disputes arising out of their contract will be certain not to include the UAA in
any choice-of-law provision. Parties will also likely take care not to choose

265. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
266. Id. at 14 (footnote omitted); cf National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding that since language of forum-selection clause contained within arbitration clause
suggested that situs of azbitration was as important as arbitration itself, the two were entire and not
divisible).
267. Cf.Booth v. Hme Publ'g, Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 929 (1lth Cir. 1990) (finding a solution to the
dilemma by holding that when parties chose Georgia law to govern arbitration, they really intended
federal law to govern since Georgia law would render the arbitration clause void).
268. Shaffer, 915 P.2d at 917.
269. See id.
at 915 n.10.
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"Oklahoma law" in their choice-of-law clauses, as a court would likely interpret this
to mean the UAA, and thus apply Shaffer in cases of alleged fraudulent inducementY Instead, parties will make clear that their contract evidences an
involvement with interstate commerce so that the FAA will apply vI As a last
resort, parties may even go so far to include the FAA in a choice-of-law clause.
IV. Conclusion
Shaffer was wrongly decided. The decision stands not only in opposition to
federal jurisprudence m but also to that of other jurisdictions and the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's prior statements which indicated that it favored arbitration. The
court's rejection of the separability doctrine frustrates the intent of the contracting
parties and clearly misconstrues a statute which envisions the arbitration clause as
distinct from the main contract in which it is contained.
Finally, the court's reasoning was flawed. While the Shaffer court was unwilling
to separate the arbitration clause from the main contract and, thus, enforce it, the
court was quick to separate a choice-of-law provision from the apparently invalid
arbitration clause in order to avoid the encroachment of the FAA on arbitration law
in Oklahoma. However, it is clear that a choice-of-law provision should not have
the effect of avoiding the application of federal law enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. Since the decision precludes preemption of the UAA by the
FAA given a choice-of-law provision selecting state law, the effect of the Shaffer
decision is sure to be that parties, aware that allegations of fraud in contracts
governed by the UAA will render the arbitration clause unenforceable pending an
adjudication of the issue by a court, will make sure that arbitration of future
contracts is governed by federal law. Parties will not choose the UAA in choice-oflaw provisions and will likely make certain that their contract evidences some
involvement with interstate commerce. The end result could well be a de facto
federalization of arbitration in Oklahoma.
John Douglas Stiner

270. But see supra note 267.
271. However, if a dispute arises, parties must make certain that they raise the preemption issue.
In a case decided only a few months prior to Shaffer, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals expressly declined
to consider the preemptive effect of the FAA in cases involving interstate commerce when the parties
had chosen New York law as governing arbitration proceedings. The court did so because neither party
raised the issue. See Williams v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 917 P.2d 998, 1002 n.5 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1995).
272. In his dissent, Justice Opala cautioned the court "not to dichotomize the body of law that
governs arbitrable issues by creating exceptions in patent discord with federal jurisprudence." Shaffer,
915 P.2d at 919 (Opala, J., dissenting).
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